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Abstract: In this essay I offer an exegetical account of Deleuze’s notion of “transcendental 
stupidity.” I show how Deleuze’s notion of transcendental stupidity concerns a fundamental 
inability on the part of human representational cognition to think difference conceptually. 
However, it is this very same inability to think difference by way of concepts that is at once 
representational cognition’s “greatest powerlessness” (to think difference) and its “highest 
power” since it is through the use of concepts that (at least for Deleuze’s transcendental 
philosophy) the maximal thinking of difference is possible, to the extent that concepts are pushed 
to the limit of what they can achieve toward this end. In the first section of this paper I provide a 
brief overview of some of the extant literature on the topic of Deleuze’s transcendental stupidity. 
I show here that while a fair amount has been written on the topic of transcendental stupidity 
more work is needed with regard to explaining some of Deleuze’s obscure statements on this 
notion in his magnum opus Difference and Repetition. Wirth (2015) and Posteraro (2016) offer 
insightful accounts of the influence of FWJ Schelling on Deleuze’s notion of transcendental 
stupidity, but both commentators emphasize the negative aspects of stupidity as a deleterious 
reality that has befallen human cognition. In contrast to these accounts, I will emphasize 
throughout this Major Research Paper the degree to which transcendental stupidity is very much 
a positive notion, precisely to the extent to which it is what allows for what Deleuze calls the 
“highest power” of thought (when pushed to the limit of its powers). In the second section of this 
paper I offer an account of the origins of the “problem of stupidity” in Deleuze’s work so as 
provide the reasons for why Deleuze wished to conceptualize a de jure transcendental (rather 
than empirical or de facto) stupidity in the first place. In the third section I will provide an 
explanatory account of transcendental stupidity by showing how it concerns a fundamental 
inability on the part of representational cognition to think difference (which Deleuze also calls an 
intensive groundlessness); however, it is this same fundamental inability which proves to be 
thought’s highest power toward the end of thinking difference. I will show that thought oscillates 
between a tendency toward ipseity (which I, following Deleuze, call thought’s “natural stupor” 
or “territorialization”) and a tendency toward differentiation or deterritorialization (the maximal 
limit of which I refer to as the “thought of stupefaction,” and which Deleuze refers to as 
“stupefied moments” of thought’s encounter with the sublime). Transcendental stupidity 





















And at last dwelling within the youthful power of thought,  
through which nature recreates itself from nought,  
as one power, one pulse, one life, 
restriction and expansion’s one continual strife. 
         —F.W.J. Schelling1 
 
 
… one fluctuates between absolute comprehension  




   … the mechanism of stupidity is the highest finality of thought.  




















There are a few recurrent problems in Gilles Deleuze’s corpus which arise so frequently in his 
work that they take on the status of a ritornello or refrain. In fact, it would not be an 
overstatement to say that the entirety of Deleuze’s oeuvre consists of so many refrains of 
problems intermingling and resonating with one another in contrapuntal series. With each refrain 
of a given problem, the problem itself undergoes inflections and modulations which affect the 
consistency of its conceptual coordinates, thereby altering the internal milieu—the nexus of 
terms, concepts, and relations—of which the problem consists. These modulations effect 
variations on the complex theme that is the problem itself.  
It is sometimes the case that a modulation will affect a problem so dramatically that the 
problem is scarcely recognizable between Deleuze’s texts, or even between passages within a 
single text. For the reader of Deleuze’s works, it can seem as if everything important has 
happened between strange intermezzi of imperceptible frequencies, which can cause a reader to 
lose their bearings when attempting to figure out just what is going on with a given problem. 
When reading Deleuze one is often left wondering what just happened? How am I to make sense 
of this problem now? In the midst of these disorienting intermezzi, one can feel as if they are 
confronted with a sea of white noise, as they struggle to detect a signal of any refrain they may 
be familiar with. It is for this reason that the reader of Deleuze’s works must above all undergo 
an apprenticeship of patient ear training, so as to become sensitive to the refrains.  
Such a becoming-sensitive might allow one to learn to make sense of things, or better: 
allow some sense to arise out of the confrontation with what might at first appear to be 
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impenetrable non-sense. My aim in the present paper is to offer explanatory remarks on just one 
of Deleuze’s problems, with the goal of aiding readers to detect a few signals in what might 
otherwise have been encountered as white noise or non-sense. The problem that I will be 
concerned with here is what Deleuze calls “the problem of stupidity.” He offers elliptical and 
obscure remarks on the notion of “transcendental stupidity” in his 1968 magnum opus Difference 
and Repetition, in the third chapter, “The Image of Thought.” I will explain the significance of 
the problem by offering an exegetical examination of this notion.  
It is immediately important to point out that the obscure way in which the problem is 
explicated in Difference and Repetition is in no way fortuitous, since for Deleuze the manner in 
which a problem is discussed is of equal or greater importance than the ‘content’ or ‘meaning’ of 
the problem; and the problem of stupidity is intended to quite literally stupefy readers: to shock 
the habits of comprehension into a forced encounter with something other than the immediately 
recognizable. Since readers encountering this problem for the first time may therefore find it 
difficult to discern precisely what Deleuze intends to convey with this idea of transcendental 
stupidity, my aim here is to explain some of the most important conceptual mechanics of this 
notion. I will do this by showing how Deleuze’s notion of transcendental stupidity draws much 
of its inspiration from certain ideas found in the Naturphilosophie of F.W.J. Schelling.  
I will show that Deleuze’s notion of transcendental stupidity concerns the relation by 
which Nature4, in the particular finite mode of human representational5 cognition, strives to think 
its own infinitely affirmative, intensive/differential genetic conditions, but is constitutively 
unable to do so otherwise than in a way which objectifies those intensive/differential relations 
into discrete concepts, terms and identities. Deleuze follows Schelling in describing this relation 
of Nature’s finite empirical manifestations—its images or presentations (Darstellungen) of 
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‘itself’ qua beings—to its infinitely intensive/differential relations as an oscillating movement of 
contraction and expansion, where “contraction” denotes the movement of Nature toward egoistic 
enclosure (or ipseity), and “expansion” denotes the movement of self-othering or differentiating.  
For Deleuze, the movement by which human representational cognition strives toward 
thinking the intensive/differential conditions of its genesis, begins from a state wherein an 
intensive preponderance of egoistic and reflective (representational) kind of thinking reigns and 
then intensively progresses (if it can, and to the extent that it can) toward thinking the 
differential/intensive conditions of its own genesis before confronting the limit of its capacities 
toward this end. Deleuze’s transcendental stupidity concerns the constitutive inability on the part 
of representational cognition to think the intensive/differential conditions of its genesis 
representationally; but it is this very inability to think intensive difference at the representational 
level that allows for the potentiality that the transcendental philosopher might yet come to think 
difference: to think otherwise (than representationally) by pushing representational cognition to 
the limit of what it can do. Here it seems requisite to offer remarks on how I am using the term 
“difference” and why Deleuze sees difference as constitutive of identity (rather than the other 
way around). 
Traditionally, difference is conceived of as secondary to identity, which latter would 
comprise the ground by way of which things could be said to differ from one another. For 
example, in Aristotle’s taxonomies of being, the identity of the genus comprises the ground by 
way of which species under that genus can be said to differ from one another by virtue of their 
differentiae. In contrast to this tradition, Deleuze establishes a philosophy in which difference is 
the transcendental ground—a “groundless ground” as I will later show—by way of which 
“surface effects” of identity are engendered (DR 117). Deleuze’s philosophy of difference is 
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grounded in a certain metaphysical reading of Leibniz’s differential calculus and Kant’s theory 
of intensive magnitudes (amongst other wide-ranging ideas).6 On this conception of difference 
reality is comprised of a ceaselessly modulating pure relationality—“the flashing world of 
communicating intensities, differences of differences … differences between differences”—that 
never coincides with ‘itself’ because there is no ‘itself’ with which ‘it’ could coincide: 
“everything bathes in its difference, its dissimilarity and its inequality, even with itself” (DR 117, 
243).	  
What follows will be divided into four sections. In the first section I will offer a brief 
survey of the extant literature on the topic of Deleuze’s transcendental stupidity. In the second 
section I will explain the origins of the problem of stupidity in Deleuze’s philosophy by showing 
how Deleuze seeks to contrast his conception of stupidity, as a truly transcendental or 
ontological stupidity, from the Cartesian conception of stupidity as error. The third section will 
explain the mechanics of Deleuze’s transcendental stupidity by showing how it pertains to a 
constitutive inability on the part of human representational cognition to think the intensive and 
differential conditions of its own genesis by way of this very mode, and where this very mode is 
a necessary condition for the thinking of that which it is unable to think. In the fourth section I 
will offer concluding remarks. 
 
I. Review of the Literature 
 
Much has been written on the problem of stupidity in Deleuze’s work. Michel Foucault offers the 
earliest discussion of this problem in his 1970 article “Theatricum Philosophicum.” Foucault 
discusses the problem of stupidity with reference to the difference between thinking 
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representationally in terms of “categories” and thinking “acategorically” (Foucault 188-189). 
Jacques Derrida also discusses the problem of stupidity and emphasizes a few obscure passages 
on this problem in Difference and Repetition wherein Deleuze states that “stupidity [bêtise] is not 
animality,” but rather a “specifically human form of bestiality” (DR 150). Derrida ultimately 
finds a certain human exceptionalism in Deleuze’s work, claiming that “these pages of 
Difference and Repetition belong to … the hegemonic tradition … where “[e]verything turns 
around this egologic of the I” (“The Transcendental ‘Stupidity’” 58). Derrida’s criticisms of 
Deleuze on these points have in many ways determined the subsequent discussions of the 
problem of stupidity.  
Since the publishing of Derrida’s criticism, there have been a number of works which 
have sought to defend Deleuze. Bernard Stiegler (2015) and Julián Ferreyra (2016) both produce 
insightful analyses that show, in different ways, how a number of Derrida’s criticisms involve 
misreadings of Deleuze. While both of these works offer important discussions which aim to 
show what the notion of transcendental stupidity is not (namely a continuance of the hegemonic 
tradition of “egologic”), there is still much work to be done in offering a positive discussion of 
what precisely transcendental stupidity is, or better: how it works.  
Jason Wirth (2015) offers the most in-depth discussion of transcendental stupidity in the 
third chapter of Schelling’s Practice of the Wild, entitled simply “Stupidity.” Wirth offers a 
number of important points on some of the connections between Deleuze and Schelling with 
regard to the most negative aspects of stupidity as a will—an “evil” will in Schelling’s words—
toward egoistic enclosure over and above difference. Tano Posteraro (2016) also provides a 
number of insightful points on the most negative aspects of stupidity (and Schelling’s concept of 
evil). However, my present discussion of transcendental stupidity will emphasize the positive 
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aspects of transcendental stupidity as it concerns an oscillating movement between a will toward 
ipseity and a will toward difference. This movement is at once the condition for the possibility of 
thinking difference as well as its impossibility, and where a will toward ipseity is to some degree 
required (and thus is not wholly negative) for the thinking of this movement. Since Deleuze 
describes transcendental stupidity as a “relation” and a “mechanism,” my aim is to describe this  
“mechanism of stupidity” by explaining how it works and why Deleuze calls stupidity “the 
highest mechanism of thought” (whereas Posteraro and Wirth emphasize the extent to which 
stupidity is also the “greatest weakness” of thought) (DR 152, 155, 275).  
In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze writes: “stupidity is neither the ground nor the 
individual, but rather this relation in which individuation brings the ground to the surface 
without being able to give it form” (DR 152 –emphasis added). I will later explain what the 
terms in this sentence mean and how this obscure relation concerns a fundamental inability, or 
‘stupidity,’ on the part of human representational cognition to think the intensive conditions for 
its genesis7 precisely because these intensive conditions cannot be thought representationally. 
But first I will show why Deleuze criticizes the traditional notion of stupidity (conceived of as 
error) and why he seeks to establish a truly transcendental stupidity.  
 
II. The Problem of Stupidity 
 
 
The problem of stupidity haunts the entirety of Deleuze’s corpus. On this point I am in 
agreement with Dork Zabunyan who claims that “it is no exaggeration to say that this problem 
[of stupidity] traverses the Deleuzian oeuvre in an obsessive manner: From Nietzsche and 
Philosophy (1962) up to What is Philosophy? (1991) … stupidity occupies and preoccupies 
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Deleuze greatly” (Zabunyan 2 –my translation). In fact, Deleuze’s preoccupation with problem 
of stupidity begins six years earlier than Zabunyan has it here. Deleuze first discusses the 
problem of stupidity in his 1956 lecture “What is Grounding?”8  
In the “What is Grounding?” lecture, Deleuze writes: “Descartes says that there are 
imbeciles de facto, but never de jure. The problem of stupidity is relegated to individual 
psychology. This interpretation is very serious … and questionable. He has eliminated stupidity 
from the theoretical problem of thought, which will be reduced to the true and the false” (WG 
51). With these remarks Deleuze draws upon comments made by Descartes in the first section of 
his Discourse on Method.9 In the Discourse Descartes calls “good sense” the “power of judging 
well and distinguishing the true from the false,” and he claims that it is “naturally equal in all 
men … for everyone thinks himself so well endowed with it [and] it is unlikely that everyone is 
mistaken” (DM 111). Deleuze summarizes Descartes claim about the equal distribution of “good 
sense” thus: “nobody say ‘I am stupid.’ Descartes says: let’s take that literally” (WG 50).  
On Descartes’ position reason “exists whole and complete in each of us” but some of us 
stray from the “right path” and the therefore “the main thing is to learn to apply it well” (DM 
111-112). In straying from the right path on Descartes’ account, one might find oneself a “de 
facto imbecile” by perhaps making a hasty and incorrect judgment about the truth or falsity of 
some state of affairs, but such cases of ‘getting it wrong’ will be just that, cases of “individual 
psychology” going astray as a result of not applying reason’s method correctly. For Descartes 
then, according to Deleuze, reason or “good sense” remains an innate faculty for properly 
distinguishing the true from the false, and stupidity amounts to error in judgment on the part of 
“individual psychologies” to correctly correspond to external states of affairs.  
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It is precisely such a conception of stupidity as “error” that Deleuze finds problematic 
and overly prominent in a history of philosophy that he sees as promoting a “dogmatic image” of 
thought wherein “thought” would primarily mean correct recognition (DR 148-149). Thirty-five 
years after his first 1956 discussion of the problem of stupidity, Deleuze (with Guattari) 
reiterates the problem in the same terms in his final book What is Philosophy?10 (1991). Here he 
writes: “Descartes makes error the feature or direction that expresses what is in principle 
negative in thought. He was not the first to do this, and ‘error’ might be seen as one of the 
principle features of the classical image of thought” (WP 52). Deleuze has a number of reasons 
for wanting to overcome the traditional conception of the “negative in thought,” conceived of as 
error.  
Deleuze first takes issue with the traditional idea that error is the negative of thought for 
the reason that he is operating in a Post-Kantian philosophical framework and cannot accept the 
kind of Cartesian dualistic framework in which a pure realm of thought could be subverted from 
without—by say sensory perception—but could not itself go astray. Rather, Deleuze follows 
Kant by demanding an immanent critique whereby the negative of thought must be explained 
from within thought itself. There is no shortage of criticisms directed against Kant in Deleuze’s 
work, but one thing that he always lauds Kant for is his critical restriction of philosophy to 
explanations from within a field of immanence.  
For this reason concerning the demands of immanent critique, Deleuze applauds Kant’s 
doctrine of transcendental illusion, which explains what “by right is the negative of thought” or 
in Deleuze’s earlier language, what inheres as a “de jure imbecility” within reason: “Kant shows 
that thought is threatened less by error than by inevitable illusions that come from within reason” 
(WP 52). Thus it becomes apparent that for Deleuze, a true conception of the negative of thought 
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must be a “de jure structure of thought,” thereby “making stupidity a transcendental problem” 
(DR 147, 151).11 However, it remains to be seen just how different Deleuze’s conception of 
transcendental stupidity will be from Kant’s conception of transcendental illusion. Here a few 
words on Kant’s notion of transcendental illusion are necessary.  
In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant states that there is a “natural and unavoidable 
illusion … that attaches to human reason unpreventably” (Critique of Pure Reason 350). Such 
transcendental illusions arise when reason attempts to transgress its proper limits by attempting 
to objectively (i.e., conceptually) cognize ideas that exceed the conditions of possibility for such 
objective cognition. Importantly, for Kant these illusions play a fundamental regulative role in 
that they spur on the faculty of understanding to strive toward higher knowledge by way of the 
progressive determination of objects toward the ideal of complete determination. Deleuze’s 
transcendental stupidity will play a similar positive role in serving as the impetus for thinking, 
but the goal of complete objective determination will be dropped in favour of the goal of striving 
to think the genetic conditions constitutive of objective (conceptual) determination otherwise 
than merely under the strictures conceptual determination itself, i.e. to think difference. And here 
we immediately land upon the crux of the difference between Deleuze’s transcendental stupidity 
and Kant’s transcendental illusion with regard to “what it means to think” (DR 131).  
Ultimately, Deleuze finds Kant’s conception of transcendental illusion to be 
unsatisfactory for a truly critical and transcendental philosophy (as Deleuze conceives of these 
terms) to the extent that for Kant, transcendental illusions are always immanent to the identity of 
a transcendental subject. Indeed Deleuze finds that ultimately Kant’s critical philosophy is 
susceptible to the same criticisms that Deleuze launches against Descartes. That is to say, for 
Deleuze, the philosophies of Kant and Descartes rest upon the form of  “good sense” and 
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“common sense,” which latter Deleuze defines as the presupposed harmoniousness of the 
faculties of “universal thinking subject” as exercised upon the “form of the unspecified object 
which corresponds to it” (DR 134). And to the extent that both Kant and Descartes assume this 
traditional model of thought conceived of as good sense and common sense, Deleuze ultimately 
finds both philosophers to be in keeping with an orthodox “image of thought” grounded upon the 
model of recognition and representation (DR 132). 
 It is precisely in order to critique the dominance of this recognitive model of thought that 
Deleuze offers a new account of what it means to think in Difference and Repetition and 
throughout his corpus. For Deleuze a new conception of the meaning of thinking amounts to 
overcoming the dominance of the form of identity throughout philosophy’s history so as to strive 
to think difference. And thus on Deleuze’s new conception of what it means to think, it is the 
form of identity itself that takes on the role of transcendental illusion, covering over and 
“cancelling” difference in the determinate “qualities” and “extensities” and representational 
thought (DR 214, 228). This fact becomes evident in his brief remarks in response to a question 
directed toward him by Alexander Philonenko during a discussion on Deleuze’s paper “The 
Method of Dramatization” held at the Sorbonne in 1967.  
Philonenko, having detected the influence of the Kantian philosopher Salomon Maimon 
in Deleuze’s paper, asks Deleuze what role Maimonian/Kantian illusion plays in Deleuze’s work. 
Deleuze’s response is initially dismissive: “if what you’re trying to ask me is: what part does 
illusion play in the schema you’re proposing? My answer is none” (Desert Islands 115). But he 
very quickly corrects himself, stating: “The illusion only comes afterward, from the direction of 
constituted extensions and the qualities that fill out these extensions” (115). So Deleuze does 
indeed offer a concept of illusion. And in fact we find this conception of illusion further clarified 
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in the conclusion of Difference and Repetition. Here, Deleuze writes: “illusion takes the 
following form: difference necessarily tends to be cancelled in the quality which covers it … It is 
a transcendental illusion because it is entirely true that difference is cancelled qualitatively and in 
extension” (DR 266). He adds: “It is nevertheless an illusion, since the nature of difference lies 
neither in the quality by which it is covered nor in the extensity by which it is explicated” (DR 
266).  
For Deleuze, the nature of difference lies in a realm of sub-representational intensities 
and virtual Ideas which, from the perspective of human representational cognition, becomes 
“covered over by an “image” made up of postulates which distort” it (DR 265). In the third 
chapter of Difference and Repetition Deleuze lists eight postulates of representational thinking 
—what Deleuze refers to as the “dogmatic image of thought”—which cover over difference with 
a model of thought grounded in the form of identity (DR 148). It is not necessary here to give a 
gloss of all eight of the postulates.12 Suffice it to say that these postulates, as Deleuze himself 
states, “culminate in the position of an identical thinking subject, which functions as a principle 
of identity for concepts in general” (DR 265). Thus on Deleuze’s account, the dominant 
conception of ‘what it means to think’ has been determined by a dogmatic image of thought that 
conceives of thought under the form of identity and the model of recognition. As Deleuze sees it, 
such a conception of thought does a grave injustice to the thought of difference to the extent that 
it conceives of difference under the form of identity; and on this understanding, difference would 
then amount to difference between identical concepts, or what Deleuze calls mere “conceptual 
difference” and the “illusion of the negative”: “the negative is difference inverted … by the 
requirements of representation which subordinate it to identity” (DR 12, 235).13  
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In opposition to this dogmatic image of thought Deleuze conceives of a philosophy of 
sub-representational virtual and intensive difference wherein the form of identity would be little 
more than a “surface” epiphenomenon of human cognitive habits—just one differential field 
among an infinite plurality of such intensive/differential fields. For this reason, Deleuze states: 
“Identity and resemblance would then be no more than inevitable illusions—in other words, 
concepts of reflection which would account for our [human] inveterate habit of thinking 
difference on the basis of the categories of representation” (DR 119). Evidently, the form of 
identity itself becomes the by-right negative of thought, or transcendental illusion, precisely to 
the extent that it covers over the thinking of Difference (genitivus subiectivus et obiectivus).14  
Deleuze inverts Kant’s doctrine of transcendental illusion to the extent that it is no longer the 
case (as it was with Kant) that an innate and “upright” faculty of human thought goes astray by 
attempting to transgress the limits of categorial conditions of possibility for cognition, but rather 
that Nature’s unconscious and differential “irrational proper to thought”15 distorts ‘itself’ by 
conceiving of ‘itself’ under the guise of human “inveterate habits” of representational cognition, 
or what is conventionally considered “rationality” (DR 131; Cinema 2 187). That is to say, the 
transcendental “‘Unconscious’ of pure thought,” or pure intensive difference folds back on 
‘itself’ and conceives of ‘itself’ in the mode of representational cognition—a mode which would 
try to conceive of difference in terms of identity (DR 194).  
Such inveterate habits comprise what Deleuze calls thought’s “natural stupor [stupeur 
naturelle]” (DR 139; Différence et Répétition 181). To be sure, humans would not be the only 
entity in which the thought of Difference bogs itself down in a “natural stupor” of habitual 
modes of being. In fact, every entity will have its own inveterate habits and natural stupors to the 
precise degree to which it simply goes about willing is continued self-sameness (or not opening 
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up to Difference, to put it negatively). And more precisely, Deleuze states that every thing just is 
(its) habits. He asks: “What organism is not made of elements and cases of repetition, of 
contemplated and contracted water, nitrogen, carbon, chlorides and sulphates, thereby 
intertwining all the habit of which it is composed?” (DR 75). Thus every organic body is 
comprised of various ‘contracted habits’ of intertwining elements which will each have a mode 
of cognition of its own, while the perceptual-psychological mode of being of the organism 
comprised of such sub-psychological contracted habits, for example the human psyche, just 
supervenes as a psychic habit upon these sub-representational modes. Deleuze writes: “habit here 
… concerns not only the sensory-motor habits that we have (psychologically), but also, before 
these, the primary habits that we are; the thousands of passive syntheses of which we are 
organically composed” (DR 74). It is on this point concerning the “contraction” of habits that the 
first resonances between the works of Deleuze and Schelling become apparent.  
In Slavoj Žižek’s perceptive commentary on Schelling’s 1813 The Ages of the Word 
(second draft), Žižek remarks upon Schelling’s description of how pure Freedom “‘contracts’ 
Being” (Žižek 16). He points out how Schelling plays on the double sense of the term 
“contraction” here: “to tighten-compress-condense and to catch, to be afflicted with, to go down 
with (an illness)” (16). Deleuze too plays on this double meaning of “contraction,” remarking 
upon how we speak of “‘contracting’ a habit” (DR 74). The main point to be made here is that 
both Deleuze and Schelling posit ontologies of pure affirmation (of Nature/Freedom in the case 
of Schelling and Nature/Difference in the case of Deleuze) which, to use Schelling’s term, 
inhibits ‘itself’ in various contractions of relative ipseity. Thus Schelling in his early 
Naturphilosophie work states: “If Nature is absolute activity, then this activity must appear as 
inhibited [Gehemmt] ad infinitum. (The original cause of this inhibition must … only be sought 
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IN ITSELF, since Nature is ABSOLUTELY active)” (First Outline of a System of the 
Philosophy of Nature 16).16  
Just as Schelling here speaks of an absolute activity that inhibits itself in its various 
contractions of Being, with Deleuze we can speak of an absolute activity of Difference that in-
habits ‘itself’ in what he will refer to in his later works (co-authored with Felix Guattari) as 
various “territorializations,” which we could likewise call ‘habitats’ or habitus. To be sure, 
Deleuze’s conception of the absolute affirmation17 of Difference, or pure ‘deterritoritalization’ is 
the genetic condition for such territorializations, such preponderances of ipseity in Nature, but 
there could be no pure absolute affirmation (or pure deterritorialization) if there were not 
contracted territories in which to express ‘itself.’ And thus there is no pure 
affirmation/deterritorialization, but rather so many milieus of an always already contaminated 
bleeding of Difference’s/Nature’s affirmation and its limitation into one another in varying 
degrees of intensity. 
 For Deleuze as for Schelling, absolute affirmation oscillates throughout Nature in 
various degrees of intensity between intensity → 0 (or minimal affirmation of Difference) and 
intensity → the limit of an entity’s affective capacities to affirm Difference. It is to a discussion 
of this intensive oscillating movement that I will turn in the following section.  However, I wish 
to first further emphasize the resonances between Deleuze and Schelling with regard to the 
concept of transcendental illusion.  
 In his study of Schelling’s 1801 Presentation of My System of Philosophy, Petr Rezvykh 
cites Schelling’s remark that “there is no individual being,” noting that “[o]utside of its 
relationship to the totality, the individual in an of itself is utterly inconceivable, and therefore 
illusory in principle” (Rezvykh 59). In the same way that for Deleuze there are only teeming 
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pluralities of various ‘images of Difference’ (in the double sense of the genitive), Rezvykh notes 
how for Schelling “individual things are simply different … images of absolute totality” (59). 
For Schelling it is only the isolated reflective understanding that would seek to separate discrete 
‘objects’ from the living nexus of relations in which it consists. For this reason Rezvykh notes 
how “ [t]ranscendental illusion is born of the very attempt to think of the individual as the 
individual … transcendental illusion, thus, emerges not in relationship to fundamental essence 
[i.e. noumenon or Ideas] but in relation to things! [i.e., determinate objects]” (60).  
Above we saw how Deleuze inverted Kant’s doctrine of transcendental illusion. Here it 
becoming apparent that Schelling has done the same. Rezvykh’s insightful remarks confirm this: 
“Schelling unexpectedly turns Kant’s critique of rational theology inside out. According to 
Schelling’s logic, transcendental illusion does not consist in the fact that we conceive of 
fundamental essence … that we are incapable, however, of imagining in concreto,” but rather, as 
noted above, it consists in conceiving of the individual thing as just what (according to the form 
of identity) it is: some determinate thing (59-60). Thus it becomes evident that Schelling is in 
agreement with Deleuze when Deleuze states: “Representation is a site of transcendental 
illusion” (DR 265).   
For Schelling it is equally illusory to posit a self-identical transcendental subject for 
whom such ‘things’ could be conceptualized, and thus he will launch critiques against Fichte’s 
absolute ego, Kant’s transcendental subject, and Hegel’s Absolute to the extent that, on 
Schelling’s account at least, such conceptions of subjectivity would seek to be the ground of 
themselves. For Schelling as for Deleuze, human cognition is not the ground of itself, but is 
rather a mere epiphenomenon of the real groundless ground of Freedom, Difference, or Nature 
(natura naturans) and ‘its’ thinking. And thus Schelling will state: “I know nothing, or my 
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knowledge to the extent that it is mine, is no true knowledge. Not I know, but only totality knows 
in me”  (Idealism and the Endgame of Theory 143). Similarly, Deleuze states that “it is always a 
third party who says ‘me’” (DR 75).  
For Deleuze and Schelling the task of thinking otherwise than under the form of 
identity—so as to try to think Difference—involves an intensive oscillation between polar 
ontological tendencies. The two ontological tendencies are: the tendency toward identity-
contraction (toward thought’s “natural stupor”) and a tendency of Differentiation-expansion 
(toward the limit of an entity’s affective capacities, which limit I call the ‘thought of 
stupefaction’ and which Deleuze refers to as “stupefied moments” of an encounter with the 
sublime) (DR 152). For human cognition (at least the kind that Deleuze is most concerned with) 
this oscillation plays out at different degrees of intensity between a tendency toward the habitual 
representational mode of thought (our natural stupor) and the thought of Difference: the 
maximum degree (or limit) of affirmation of Difference to which we are able to push concepts. It 
is to a discussion of these oscillating tendencies that I turn in the following section. I will show 
that Deleuze’s transcendental stupidity concerns the relation between these polar tendencies and 
it amounts to expressing a fundamental inability of human cognition to think Difference by way 
of representational means; however it is this very inability that may serve as the positive means 
for pushing representation and concepts toward the maximum degree of thinking Difference.  
 




In the third chapter of Difference and Repetition, “The Image of Thought,” Deleuze 
offers a few dense pages on the issue of transcendental stupidity. Here Deleuze takes up the task 
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of making “stupidity a transcendental problem” (DR 151). The first important thing to discuss 
here is precisely how Deleuze is using the term “transcendental.” For Deleuze, the notion of the 
transcendental differs significantly from the Kantian conception. Indeed the entirety of 
Difference and Repetition amounts to an extended critique of the extent to which Kantian 
transcendental philosophy is not transcendental enough. As Deleuze sees it, Kant’s philosophy is 
not transcendental enough to the extent that it is concerned with mere conditions of possibility 
for objective cognition rather than with genetic conditions of real experience. That is to say, 
Kant’s transcendental philosophy restricts itself to strictly discursive conditions of possibility 
located in the categories of the understanding and the relation of these categories to the pure 
forms of intuition (time and space).  
In opposition to the Kantian conception of transcendental philosophy as it concerns the 
restriction of philosophy to strictly discursive conditions of possible experience, Deleuze takes 
up the Post-Kantian conception of transcendental philosophy as ‘meta-critical’ and as inquiring 
into genetic conditions of real (rather than merely discursively possible) experience. Thus, 
Deleuze states: “it is not the conditions of all possible experience that must be reached, but the 
conditions of real experience. Schelling had already proposed this aim and defined philosophy as 
a superior empiricism” (Desert Islands 36).18 Following Schelling, Deleuze takes up the task of 
meta-critique, where a ‘meta-critical’ philosophical orientation is one that, rather than inquiring 
into conditions of possibility for experience of objects (as does Kant’s critical philosophy), 
inquires instead into the genetic conditions constitutive of a transcendental subjectivity that could 
then critically inquire into its own discursive conditions for possible experience of objects, or 
object-ivity. Meta-critical philosophy seeks to provide an account of the genetic conditions 
constitutive of the subject-object distinction itself.  
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Deleuze also locates the genetic conditions for subjectivity in a “superior empiricism” 
and what he calls, in reference to Schelling, the intensive “play of pure depotentialisation and 
potentiality” (DR 190-191). Most importantly for my purposes is the fact that it is precisely the 
oscillating play of these two polar ontological tendencies—depotentialisation (or what Deleuze 
calls a tendency toward identity/‘territorialization’) and potentiality (a tendency toward 
difference/deterritorialization)—that concerns the mechanism of transcendental stupidity. First I 
need to explain some of the key terms that Deleuze uses in his description of transcendental 
stupidity, and then I will discuss the role of these two ontological tendencies.  
A condensed account of Deleuze’s notion of transcendental stupidity is found in the third 
chapter of Difference and Repetition where he writes: “Stupidity is neither the ground nor the 
individual, but rather this relation in which individuation brings the ground to the surface without 
being able to give it form” (DR 152). Part of the difficulty of understanding this passage 
concerns simply establishing what Deleuze means by many of these terms.19 This difficulty is 
compounded by the fact that Deleuze uses the term “ground” in at least four different ways in 
Difference and Repetition. Three of these “grounds” need not concern us here since it is precisely 
against these—which Deleuze attributes to Plato, Kant, and Hegel respectively—that Deleuze 
opposes his own conception of a “groundless” ground. Following Schelling, Deleuze will call his 
ground a “groundlessness” [sans fond] and an “Ungrund” (DR 229). He will sometimes use 
“ground” and “groundlessness” interchangeably as when he speaks of a “ground, or … 
groundlessness … in which original Nature resides in its chaos” (DR 242). Deleuze also refers to 
this groundless ground as “depth” and “intensive quantity” (DR 230).  
With respect to depth, Deleuze specifically references Schelling’s conception of this 
notion, stating: “Schelling said that depth is not added from without to length and breadth but 
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remains buried, like … the differend which creates them” (DR 230). Deleuze does not mention 
which work of Schelling’s he is drawing upon here, however it appears that he is referencing the  
“Stuttgart Seminars” where Schelling states that the spatial dimensions of length and breadth are 
related by a transcendental third—what Schelling will elsewhere call a “living copula”—which 
articulates them, and which is a key Schellingian term: “Indifference” [Indifferenz] (Idealism and 
the Endgame of Theory 217; The Ages of the World 105). This key term “Indifference” is 
precisely what Schelling will call “Ungrund” in his 1809 Freiheitsschrift. Indeed it is only a 
mere two sentences after first establishing his concept of “Ungrund” in the Freiheitsschrift that 
he refers to it as “absolute indifference” (Philosophical Investigations 68).  
The main point to be made here is that the “living copula,” “Ungrund” and “Indifference” 
are all terms that designate transcendental Difference: they do not designate some thing but 
rather the originary difference (or ‘differend’ as Deleuze puts it above) by which Nature 
articulates or distinguishes itself into various oppositional pairs —length/breadth, hot/cold, 
fast/slow, past/present, present/future, etc.—and the infinitely many differences by way of which 
these pairs relate to one another (precisely by way of their difference to one another). I will 
expand upon these points later when I address the issue of quantitative difference. However, I 
first wish to clarify the meaning of the term “surface” as Deleuze uses it in his description of 
transcendental stupidity, since the relation between depth (groundless ground) and surface is 
precisely the relation between intensive difference and representational cognition—the relation 
that is at issue in Deleuze’s transcendental stupidity.    
Deleuze uses the term “surface” in a very specific sense in Difference and Repetition. In 
this work “surface”—or better, “surface effect”—refers to the specifically human mode of 
empirical cognition as Kant defines it with respect to the harmonious functioning of a subject’s 
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faculties under the legislative dominance of the faculty of understanding. “Surface” for Deleuze 
thus refers to the “illusion” that I mentioned above whereby human empirical cognition 
represents experience in terms of identity, resemblance, quality, extensity and categories (DR 
235). Thus Deleuze refers to the “surface effects which characterize the distorted world of 
representation, and express the manner in which the in-itself of difference [intensity]20 hides 
itself by giving rise to that which covers it” (DR 117). To be sure, Deleuze refers to “surface” not 
merely with respect to human representation, but with respect more broadly to what he calls the 
“actual” (in contrast to the “virtual” and the intensive) and what I earlier referred to as ipseity-
contractions and “territorializations.”  
Accordingly human representation would then just be one mode of Difference 
differenciating21, actualizing, or territorializing ‘itself’—one mode of empirical manifestation 
amidst an infinite plurality of fields of other such modes, in which (virtual/intensive/relational) 
Difference folds back on ‘itself’ by conceiving ‘itself’ in the specifically human mode of 
representational cognition. This is not at all to say that on Deleuze’s position, there is such a 
thing as a “human” that then represents to itself the notion of things outside of itself. The point 
here is much rather that for whatever contingent reasons, there just happens to be this 
preponderance of a mode of Difference wherein “representations” of “things” occur, and ‘we’ 
(this preponderance of a mode) call this preponderance “human.”  
That we identify and categorize things, our very ‘selves’ included, is just one of our 
habitual territorializations. It just happens to be the one habit that Deleuze is most concerned 
with in Difference and Repetition. This is the case inasmuch as one of the main aims of 
Difference and Repetition on the whole is to show that representation suffers from a constitutive 
“Incapacity”22 in its efforts to think difference conceptually. And yet, one of the main aims of 
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Difference and Repetition is also to think difference conceptually—to “create a concept of 
difference” (DR 27). The previous two sentences taken together essentially encapsulate 
Deleuze’s notion of transcendental stupidity, as I will be able to show in passages to follow.  
Having defined Deleuze’s use of the term “surface,” I can return to the question of what 
Deleuze means by “intensive quantity” when he refers to a groundless ground of Difference (DR 
230). The groundless ground is pure intensity—“difference in-itself” Deleuze calls it—which is 
unthinkable from the perspective of representation (the “surface”) (DR 252). Thus when Deleuze 
speaks about transcendental stupidity as the relation in which individuation “brings the ground to 
the surface” but is unable to give the ground “form,” he is speaking about a relation in which the 
surface (representation, the faculty of understanding) tries to ‘in-form’ the ground (intensity) 
with a concept—to “give form” simply means to determine things under concepts—and fails.  
What Deleuze is referring to here can also be addressed by means of Kant’s dynamic 
sublime. Deleuze is speaking about the relation in which a subject—the transcendental 
philosopher in this particular case—attempts to think the ground (difference in-itself) in terms of 
concepts of the understanding and fundamentally fails in this task due precisely to a shocking 
encounter with both Difference’s/Nature’s sheer excessive immensity as well as “the inexistence 
of a whole which could be thought” (Cinema 2 168). The issues here have to do with Kant’s 
notions of the dynamic sublime and negative presentation (Darstellung). In the Critique of the 
Power of Judgement Kant describes cases in which the faculty of imagination encounters (in a 
truly painful manner) an immense “formlessness” in nature—what Deleuze is calling 
“difference-in-itself”/intensity—which it is unable to schematize such that the understanding 
could form a concept for it. As Martha Helfer notes, in cases of the sublime, “the imagination, 
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rather than producing a direct schematic presentation, races to infinity. The subject feels 
threatened by this failure of the faculty of presentation” (Helfer 42).  
However, it is precisely this overpowering nature of the sublime that, by way of 
bypassing the faculty of understanding, sends a shock straight to the faculty of reason which 
affirms its transcendental power to produce an idea. As Helfer notes: “Negative Darstellung 
forces the subject to think the supersensible—the idea—without actually producing an objective 
presentation of this idea. Thus it presents nothing except the process—the striving or effort (die 
Bestrebung)—of Darstellung itself” (45). Space constraints do not allow for a full elaboration on 
Deleuze’s reconceptualization of the dynamic sublime23 here, but suffice it to say that in 
Deleuze’s account of transcendental stupidity, the effort of trying to think the (groundless) 
ground is something akin to this processual striving effort which is taking place between the 
ground and thought, where the ground is unable to think ‘itself’ precisely because of its nature as 
an infinite formlessness (pure difference), and the thought of Difference can only present ‘itself’ 
to ‘itself’ (at least in its most intense encounters with ‘itself’) as this sheer formlessness.  
The idea of a thought that could present itself to itself as just what it is—the dream of full 
presence or “absolute comprehension” in Schlegel’s words (see epigram)—is an impossibility, as 
Fichte has shown, to the extent that in order to be something, that something needs to constantly 
distinguish itself from something else: “The essence of reason consists in my positing myself, 
but I cannot do this without positing a world in opposition to myself” (Fichte 83; cf. Giovanelli 
72-74). Positing a self just is this ceaseless distinguishing of self from not-self. Thus there must 
be some minimum of self-differentiation in order for something to simply be. And conversely, 
the idea that there could be some “infinite formlessness”—“infinite affirmation” as Schelling 
calls it or “absolute incomprehension” in Schlegel’s words—is likewise impossible in that, as 
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discussed above, infinite affirmation of difference requires the limitations of finitude in order to 
have something in which to affirm its infinite difference. And thus, to borrow again from 
Schlegel, what we get with Deleuze is an ontology of so many different modes of Nature, 
oscillating in various degrees of intensity “between absolute comprehension and absolute 
incomprehension” (Schlegel 113 –my emphasis). These modes oscillate as what Deleuze calls 
“intensive quantities.” What are these intensive quantities? 
Firstly, intensive quantities are not quantities in the sense of discrete numerical units that 
may be added to one another to form a conglomerate unit that is the sum of its parts. These 
discrete kinds of quantities are what Kant refers to in the first Critique as “extensive magnitudes” 
(Critique of Pure Reason 233). Rather, intensive magnitudes are continuous gradations which do 
not have summative whole-part relations as do extensive magnitudes. For example, Deleuze 
offers the case of 30 degrees of heat. He notes that 30 degrees of heat is not the addition of 3 
units of 10 degrees of heat: “the 30-degree heat is not the sum of three times ten degrees, it is at 
the level of extensive quantities that thirty is 10+10+10, but thirty degrees is not three 10-degree 
heats. In other words, the rules of addition and subtraction are not valid for intensive quantities” 
(Lecture 03/28/78 –my translation).  
Rather than rules of addition and subtraction defining the relations between intensive 
quantities, they are defined in terms of degrees of gradation within a continuous multiplicity 
where every degree is just the infinitely small (vanishing) degree that it is, but also where every 
degree of intensity can only be defined by way of its difference from every other degree in the 
infinitely continuous nexus of degrees comprising an intensity. Each degree just is its difference 
from the other degrees. It is due to the fact that every intensive degree is ‘in itself’ infinitely 
small and yet continuous within a heterogeneous nexus of intensive degrees that Deleuze refers 
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to intensity as “difference in itself.” Intensities are differential relations; they are not comprised 
of discrete units24, but of differences: “differences between differences” (117). As Craig Lundy 
points out: “Difference can then be said to occur both at every level [of intensity] and between 
every level in precisely that way in which they [intensities] differ” (Lundy 70). On this point, 
Deleuze describes “intensive ordinates” thus: “Components [intensive magnitudes] remain 
distinct, but something passes from one to the other, something that is undecidable between 
them. There is an area ab that belongs to both a and b, where a and b become indiscernible” (WP 
20-21).  
Deleuze draws upon a great number of philosophers for his concept of intensity. For 
example, he expands on Spinoza’s theory of affects and powers which defines entities by their 
capacities to affect and be affected, the intensities they are capable of being affected by and the 
intensities they are able to muster in their relations with other entities. He also no doubt draws 
from Nietzsche’s conception of entities as “multiplicit[ies] of forces” and relations for which our 
“arithmetic is too crude,” due precisely to the fact that ours “is only an arithmetic of single 
elements,” or what I have referred to above as extensive quantities (Nietzsche, Late Notebooks 
8). Deleuze also draws upon “Schelling’s theory of difference and powers,” or “quantitative 
difference”—referred to “intensive quantity” and “difference in quantity” in Difference and 
Repetition—and it is this influence which will concern me here, since Schelling’s notion of 
quantitative difference bears most on the issues concerning transcendental stupidity (DR 226, 
230, 325).  
The influence of Schelling’s notion of quantitative difference on Deleuze’s philosophy 
has thus far not received any attention in the literature. This is a considerable lacuna since the 
notion of quantitative difference is important for an understanding of Deleuze’s transcendental 
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stupidity and his concept of intensity. It is important because it shows that stupidity relates to 
difference in an intensive/quantitative manner: stupidity denotes the necessity on the part of pure 
difference to quantitatively (or intensively) inhibit itself in representational cognition (if ‘it’ 
should so seek to conceptualize ‘itself’), but this same inhibiting amounts to the fact that 
difference can only conceive of ‘itself’ in a diminished degree of intensity, and as object-ified, 
i.e., precisely as other than it ‘really is’—because ‘it’ is not. Quantitative difference is in-
principle unthinkable for representational cognition; but it is that which gives to be thought. 
 It is clear that Deleuze was is fact influenced by this Schellingian notion of quantitative 
difference. For example, he states in one of his lectures: “Schelling has a very beautiful word … 
that I take a little everywhere … This is what Schelling calls quantitative differentiation” 
(Lecture 26/04/83 –my translation). Quantitative differentiation essentially concerns the fact that, 
for both Deleuze and Schelling, reality is univocal and intensive. As Spinozist immanentists 
about reality (or ‘monists’ provided we understand this term in a very specific sense), they 
cannot hold a position in which there would be any real qualitative difference in being, or 
hierarchy of being in Nature/Immanence, for then we would be dealing with an Aristotelian-style 
metaphysics of equivocity, comprised of hierarchically arranged categories of being. For 
Schelling and Deleuze, ‘all’ is productive Immanence: ‘all’ is Spinozian Nature qua natura 
naturans. And thus there can be no real qualitative distinction, or equivocity, in Immanence, 
precisely because ‘all’25 is just univocal intensification of Nature/Difference—“pure intensity” in 
Schelling’s words— intensified differently in and by every finite mode of Intensity (First Outline 
208). Thus, Daniel Whistler writes: “for a rigorous monism, [intensive] quantity is the only way 
to distinguish individuals” (Whistler 105). Individuals (modes) are different intensities: not 
things, but relations between relations. 
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The role of intensive magnitudes and quantitative difference is of crucial significance in 
Post-Kantian debates.26 For Kant, all that can be known a priori about that by which qualities of 
sensation are given (“matter” for Kant) is that they are given as intensive magnitudes or degrees: 
“in all quality … we can know a priori nothing save [in regard to] their intensive quantity, 
namely that they have a degree” (–cited in Giovanelli 8). Qualities, for example the quality of 
heat, are given to sensation in intensive degrees which from the standpoint of empirical cognition 
can become measurable, if one establishes some criterion by which to distinguish degrees of heat 
from one another, as is allowed by the use of a thermometer. In contrast to extensive quantities 
which are measureable in an additive fashion by way of conjunction of discrete parts, Giovanelli 
points out that intensive magnitudes are rather measured “through equilibrium (two bodies have 
the same temperature if putting them into contact does not lead to mutual variations)” (10). Thus, 
Giovanelli continues, “the degree of temperature does not determine ‘how much heat’ is 
contained in bodies, but only the difference in the ‘level’ of its distribution relative to their heat 
capacity. Without this difference in level, the very distinction between hot and cold, and thus the 
concept of ‘degree’ is meaningless” (10-11).  
It is only the difference between two degrees of any sensation that makes those respective 
degrees the degrees that they ‘are.’ However, a degree should not be taken as some discrete unit, 
inasmuch as intensive magnitudes are continuous; any ‘one degree’ just is its difference from the 
other degrees that make up the continuous nexus of a given intensity, e.g. the intensity of heat. 
Intensive degrees then are like the differentials of Leibniz’s calculus; they are pure relations, the 
degrees between which tend toward infinity (vanishing): “between every possible degree of these 
forces, down to the total disappearance of all intensity (=0) it is possible to have an infinite 
number of intermediate degrees” (Schelling, Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature 226) The 
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difference between positive magnitudes (say, heat) and negative magnitudes (cold) is only 
distinguishable by way of that point of equilibrium that separates them (thus engendering their 
relational realities)—Schelling’s Indifferenzpunkt or “point of indifference = 0”—the point at 
which their difference (and thus their realities) would disappear (Giovanelli 101). However, as 
Giovanelli shows, “temperatures never equalize entirely. Instead, the difference in temperature 
between two bodies approaches zero in an asymptotic fashion”27, and thus a “sensitive 
thermometer would show that one of the two bodies remains slightly hotter than the other and 
will continue to do so to infinity” (10).  
We need not limit ourselves to the quality of heat here. For Deleuze and Schelling all 
qualities are produced from out of a sub-qualitative realm of quantitative differences of different 
forces (intensities) in their oscillations between positive and negative magnitudes. As Schelling 
states: “all quality rests on [intensive] forces insofar as they have a specific quantity (degree), 
and since matter presupposes for its possibility opposing forces, and the relationship of these 
forces according to their degree” (Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature 252). As mentioned above, 
two of these opposing forces are those of the expansive (positive) force of difference and the 
negative contractile force of ipseity. It is helpful to think of these two forces, as do Deleuze and 
Schelling, with regard to velocity. The expansive affirmative force in Schelling’s words, moves 
at an “infinite velocity” that “would permit no real intuition” and thus requires “inhibitions 
which continually set bounds to the expansion” (First Outline of a System 16).28  
Similarly Deleuze speaks of the “infinite speed” of chaos (or Difference) and the 
inhibiting need (on our part) for concepts that “make up ‘the slow beings’ that we are” (WP 36, 
42). In the affirmative ontologies of Deleuze and Schelling the expansive force of Difference 
moves at infinite speeds. However this affirmative force requires inhibitions in which and with 
	   31	  
which to affirm ‘itself.’ And thus Nature, as Giovenelli shows, “is a continual oscillation 
between permanence and becoming, the tendency toward conservation [contraction] and the 
tendency toward transformation [expansion]” (106). It is precisely this oscillation that concerns 
Deleuze with his conception of transcendental stupidity.  
As Deleuze sees it, human cognition’s tendency toward contraction plays out as the 
tendency toward representation, reflection, thinking in terms of discrete identities and divisions 
between ‘subjects’ and ‘objects.’ These modes of cognition denote a slowing down on the part of 
affirmative Difference. It is for this reason that Daniel Whistler writes, with regard to Schelling 
(but which could equally apply to Deleuze): “The category of representation fails to 
acknowledge … quantitative differences … Reflection (and so representation) is to be defined as 
minimally expressive [or intense] thought” (Whistler 110). Just as Schelling speaks of “degrees 
of the absolute” we can speak with Deleuze of ‘degrees of Intensity/Difference” (Ideas for a 
Philosophy of Nature 48). And here representational cognition would denote a minimally intense 
degree of ‘thinking’ (Difference) but nonetheless one which is required if our aim, as Deleuze’s 
is in Difference and Repetition, is to conceptualize Difference: “to specify the concept of 
difference as such” (DR 27). If this is the theoretical aim of Deleuze’s transcendentalist 
ambitions, it is quickly apparent that this aim is secondary to the practical goal of pushing 
concepts to the limit of their power to intensify the thinking of Difference.  
Transcendental stupidity denotes the process of Intensity/Difference rising to the 
“surface” (representational cognition), and trying to give ‘itself’ a “form,” a concept that could 
adequately think it, and necessarily failing since no form could contain ‘its’ forces of infinite 
affirmation—its “infinite velocities.” Intensity attempts to comprehend ‘itself’—comprehend 
both in the sense of “understand” and “circumscribe within definite limits” (as when we speak of 
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the “comprehension of a concept,” the set of predicates attributable to the concept of 
something)—in the mode of human representation by trying to in-form ‘itself’ with a concept. 
However, it is in this very endeavour that ‘it’ is ‘stupid’ or transcendentally Impotent with 
respect to cognizing ‘itself’ since this very endeavour denotes a restricting or contracting of 
‘itself’ (into identity)—the precise opposite of its infinitely affirmative expansive force. For 
human representational cognition the condition for understanding Difference is at once the 
condition for understanding it in a minimally intense degree, and thus representational cognition 
can be said to be transcendentally “stupid” (or Incapable) in its theoretical pursuit of 
conceptualizing difference.  
And yet there is a positive power of transcendental stupidity inasmuch as it is by way of 
the practical aim of pushing our representational habits of cognition (our psychic “natural 
stupor”) to the limit of their powers to think Difference that we might yet encounter, in what 
Deleuze calls “stupefied moments [moments de stupeur]”—stupefied in the sense of shocking to 
our cognitive habits—the sublime in Nature/Difference/Intensity (DR 152; Différence et 
Répétition 197). To encounter the sublime would be to encounter the thought of stupefaction, 
where our faculty of understanding is reduced to complete impotence but where our power to 
affirm the Idea of Difference is intensified to its maximum—its limit. Then, as Jean-Clet Martin 
writes: “one enters a form of exhaustion, a superior form of stupidity which is like a new 
vigilance” (“Deleuze et Derrida” 53 –my translation). In Kant’s rendition of the dynamic 
sublime, the reduction of our empirical being to impotence has the positive counter-effect of 
awakening a power in the faculty of Reason which then allows us to think the (moral) “idea of 
humanity in our subject,” and its superiority over nature (Critique of the Power of Judgement 
141).  
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Deleuze’s rendition of the dynamic sublime is different: a faculty of Ideas is awakened—
there arises, in Martin’s word, a certain “vigilance”—when our empirical mode of cognition is 
“exhausted,” but Deleuze’s faculty of Ideas is nothing like Kant’s. Thus Daniel Smith states: 
“For Deleuze, the faculty of ideas is no longer identified with Reason; rather, Deleuze posits 
Ideas within sensibility itself and defines them, not by their transcendence to Nature, but rather 
in terms of their immanence to experience itself (the noumenal as immanent)” (Essays on 
Deleuze 231). The question of just what these Ideas are, would take us afield here.29 Suffice it to 
say that the Ideas along with Deleuze’s intensities comprise the sub-representational realm by 
way of which representational cognition is generated and with respect to which it is 
transcendentally stupid so long as it would attempt to identify them with a concept. But for all 
that, it is precisely this “stupidity”—the by-right “inability to think” differential Ideas and 
intensities “at the empirical level”—that is “the source of [thought’s] highest power” inasmuch 
as it is “the existence of [this] stupidity which forces it [thought] to think” precisely by 
intensively striving to differentiate itself from this stupidity: “Recall Heidegger’s statement: 
‘What gives us most cause for thought is the fact that we do not yet think’” (DR 144, 275).  
What Deleuze calls the “inability to think” Difference “at the empirical level,” i.e., by 
way representation, is also the “highest power of thought” to intensify the Idea of difference, 
since it is precisely by pushing this inability or fundamental “Incapacity” to it limits that we 
might be able to think difference otherwise than representationally: “Difference is liberated only 
at the limits of its power” (DR 144, 300). At such liminal moments of course it would be less 
“us” thinking than an allowing of the Idea of Difference to think through us by opening ourselves 
to the thought of differential relations and transforming our habitual ways of cognizing and 
identifying, to the degree that we can. At such sublime moments of stupefaction concepts might 
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be pushed to limit of their abilities, and the intensive ground of Difference rises to the surface of 
human cognition without being able to take conceptual form. The groundless ground of intensive 
difference, in its overpowering immensity—its “chaos” of “infinite speeds,” differential relations 
vanishing to infinity, and “the inexistence of a whole which could be thought”—sends a shock to 
the faculty of thought at which point, “thought at last thinks … ‘the fact that we do not yet 
think’” (DR 153; WP 42; Cinema 2 168).  
Curiously, the English translation of Difference and Repetition omits a key passage in 
which Deleuze describes the fundamental Incapacity30 to think Difference (“at the empirical 
level”) (DR 144). Here Deleuze writes: “Thought only thinks when it is constrained or forced to 
think, in the face of that which ‘gives to be thought,’ of what is to be thought—and what is to be 
thought is also the unthinkable or the non-thought, that is the perpetual fact that ‘we are not yet 
thinking’” (Différence et Répétition 188 –my translation). In this passage it becomes apparent 
that for Deleuze something needs to force thinking to arise, and this can only happen in a 
sublime encounter with thought’s limit—a sublime event of stupefaction—in which Intensity 
gives itself directly to be thought by shocking the inveterate habits of representational cognition 
and intensifying the thought of Difference to the degree that it can. At such sublime moments of 
a direct encounter with Intensity we might be then be able think the fact that we are always 
already not yet thinking difference.31  
The conditions for the possibility of comprehending Difference, Immanence, and 
Intensity, i.e., concepts, representation, identity, transcendental philosophy itself, are also the 
conditions for the impossibility of thinking difference by way of these very means. And yet it is 
this fundamental Incapacity which is representation’s highest power to the extent that it is this 
very same Incapacity that gives to be thought otherwise—that might yet be pushed to the limits 
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of what it can do. The limits of what concepts are able to do in their efforts to think difference 
remain to be seen. The powers of transcendental stupidity await further intensification.  
 




I have sought to show that throughout Deleuze’s corpus, he has been at pains to reconceive the 
“negative of thought.” From his early “What is Grounding?” lecture up until his final work What 
is Philosophy?, Deleuze strove to offer a conception of the negative of thought with which to 
oppose the traditional notions of this negative “enemy of cognition” (WG 36). Deleuze never 
tired of combatting the idea that the negative of thought is “error.” The conception of error as the 
negative of thought grounds itself on the idea that thinking means “correct recognition” or 
truthful correspondence between subjects’ judgements and external states of affairs. For Deleuze 
this presupposition of a subject-object distinction on the part of Descartes, amounts to the fact 
that Descartes leaves the form of his thought unthought: “When philosophy rests its beginning on 
such implicit or subjective presuppositions, it can claim innocence, since it has kept nothing back 
—except of course the essential—namely the form of this discourse … the form of 
representation or recognition in general” (DR 130-131).  
 Deleuze follows the Post-Kantian tradition of offering a transcendental philosophy that 
explains the genesis of the subject-object distinction without presupposing any metaphysical 
dualism or innate faculty of thought. For Deleuze the negative of thought cannot be something 
extrinsic to thought, as it is for Descartes, but must be explained from within thought, i.e., 
immanently. And it is for this reason that Deleuze champions Kant’s notion of transcendental 
illusion. However, I have sought to show that Deleuze reconceptualizes the notion of 
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transcendental illusion. The transcendental illusion as Deleuze sees it, and as he reconceptualizes 
it with his notion of transcendental stupidity, concerns the fact that representational cognition can 
only cognize the intensive differential conditions of its genesis as other than they really ‘are,’ 
i.e., in concepts and as empirical qualities and extensities. However, as I have shown, 
transcendental stupidity is a positive notion in Deleuze’s philosophy since it is by striving to 
think otherwise than according to the strictures of representational cognitive habits and 
inhibitions (“slow beings that we are”) that we might yet come to push such habits to the 
intensive limit of their abilities to affirm Difference.   
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Notes 
 
1 Schelling, “Two Poems,” p. 189.  
2 Friedrich Schlegel, Philosophical Fragments, p. 113 
3 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 155. Henceforth cited as DR.  
4 By “Nature” here I mean something akin to Spinoza’s Substance qua Deus sive Natura, or 
simply Reality. Both Deleuze and Schelling follow Spinoza by positing immanent ontologies of 
the production of Nature. And most importantly, both Schelling and Deleuze modify Spinoza’s 
ontology by, in Deleuze’s words, “mak[ing] substance turn around the modes” (DR 304).  
5 Deleuze uses the term “representation” in a number of ways in Difference and Repetition. I am 
agreement with Joe Hughes, when he states: “The word ‘representation’ has countless meanings 
in Difference and Repetition. Sometimes representation will be equated with the ‘form of 
identity,’ sometimes with the form of the ‘concept’ … Deleuze will equate representation with 
‘knowledge,’ the ‘proposition,’ the solution to a problem, consciousness, opinion and judgement. 
The list is quite long, but all of these instances refer back to one thing: the object” (Hughes 1). 
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Hughes goes on to point out that the form of identity in the object is perceived in terms of the 
objectively determined “qualities” and “extensities” that fill it out, citing Deleuze’s remarks in 
Difference and Repetition on this point: “extensity and quality are the two forms of generality … 
precisely this is sufficient to make them the elements of representation” (DR 235). For Deleuze, 
the elements of representation (quality and extensity) cover over the ground of difference, which 
is quantitative (rather than qualitative) and intensive (rather than extensive). I will address these 
points below. Finally, Deleuze associates the terms “reflection” and “recognition” with 
representation (DR 34, 73). Representation, in Deleuze’s account of it in Difference and 
Repetition does not belong to one particular epoch, but rather stretches in various forms from 
Plato through Aristotle (“organic representation”) up to Leibniz and Hegel (“orgiastic 
representation”) and well into twentieth-century with Bertrand Russell (“logical formalism … of 
recognition”) (DR 153-154). And various permutations of representation are no doubt well and 
thriving in the present historical juncture.  
6 Space constraints prevent me from addressing the role of the differential calculus in Deleuze’s 
conception of difference, however I will later discuss Deleuze’s concept of intensity, which 
shares a number of affinities with his concept of the differentials (some scholars even contend 
that the differentials just are intensities). With regard to Deleuze’s concept of difference and the 
differential calculus, see Daniel Smith’s excellent essay “Genesis and Difference.”  
7 Deleuze’s philosophy strives to provide an account of the genetic conditions constitutive of 
cognition. More broadly Deleuze’s philosophy strives to provide an account of the genetic 
conditions of everything, and this is no doubt why he considered himself a “pure metaphysician” 
(“Responses to a Series of Questions” 42). Deleuze is also a pure (onto)-logician and his (onto)-
logics of difference aim to provide nothing less than transcendental conditions for the genesis of 
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empirical states of affairs (whether of finite cognition as in Difference and Repetition, or 
historical assemblages in A Thousand Plateaus, or different kinds of cinematic images in his 
Cinema books). His aim to provide an account of the genesis of cognition follows from the Post-
Kantian demand of establishing a meta-critique that would provide an immanent and genetic 
account of the subject-object distinction (and thus cognition). Deleuze’s task of establishing an 
account of the genesis of subjective cognition also takes up from Leibniz’s demand of providing 
the sufficient reason for the existence of a state of affairs; everything must have a reason and the 
challenge for Deleuze is to provide a transcendental logic that would explain how a given state of 
affairs came about. Thus, Deleuze’s interest is in providing a “logic of sense” (the title of one of 
his books) that would explain the genesis of representational cognition from out of a non-
representational transcendental field of sense. Finally, Deleuze takes up Nietzsche’s task of 
genealogy, whereby the challenge is to think (or “make sense of”) this determinate historical 
milieu’s modes of cognition, how they came to be, how we are cognizing—by way of what 
practices, conditioned by what values, perspectives, modes of existence, relations of power—
here and now? 
8 Henceforth cited as WG 
9 Henceforth cited as DM 
10 Henceforth cited as WP 
11 I should point out here that Deleuze’s use of the term “transcendental” differs significantly 
from Kant’s use of this term. Cursorily, Kant uses the term “transcendental” to designate 
immanent a priori conditions on the part of subjects’ cognitive faculties for the possible 
experience of determinate objects. Deleuze uses the term “transcendental” to designate the 
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immanent conditions for the genesis of real (rather than possible) experience. I will address these 
points in greater detail below.    
12 Deleuze offers a condensed synopsis of the eight postulates in DR, 167. I have been primarily 
discussing postulates one through five here, with an emphasis on the fifth postulate: “the 
postulate of the negative, or of error (in which error expresses everything which can go wrong in 
thought, but only as the product of external mechanisms).” 
13 To be sure, Deleuze uses the term “negative” and “negation” in a number of ways in 
Difference and Repetition, but he is critical of all the philosophers who he claims subordinate 
difference (as he conceives it) to the negative. He is most critical of Hegelian mediation and 
negation on this point (DR 10, 64 268).   
14 Following Deleuze I will sometimes spell “Difference” with the majuscule, and sometimes 
with the lower case.  
15 Deleuze calls the thought of Difference an “unconscious of pure thought,” and it is for this 
reason concerning differential Thought’s unconsciousness—its excessive more-than-
consciousness—that he refers to ‘it’ as an “irrational proper to thought” (DR 155). Here, “non-
rational” or “otherwise-than-rational,” might be better terms to use to describe the thought of 
Difference, since it is not so much that the thought of Difference is some kind of senseless 
madness, but rather that it works in ways fundamentally Outside of what commonly goes by the 
name of human rationality.   
16 The italics and capitals in this passage are Schelling’s.  
17 For Deleuze and Schelling difference is a positive and affirmative idea. Difference affirms 
difference differently by repeating (itself). Deleuze’s and Schelling’s conceptions of difference 
must be therefore be distinguished from all negative conceptions of difference. In any case the 
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terms “positive” and “negative” are fraught with ambiguity when we are dealing with 
conceptions of a difference by which these opposed terms could be distinguished, and which thus 
must be in a sense both positive and negative and neither. Here we would need to make all of the 
necessary comparisons between Schelling’s Ungrund/Indifference, Deleuze’s Difference, and 
Derrida’s différance with regard to the question of positivity and negativity (a worthwhile 
endeavour). For those interested in the connction between Schelling and Derrida on these points, 
see Fiona Stienkamp’s “Différance and Indifference” and Philipp Schwab’s excellent 
“Nonground and the Metaphysics of Evil.” With regard to the connection between Derrida’s 
différance and Deleuze’s Difference, see Daniel Smith, Essays on Deleuze, pp. 271-286.  
18 Cf. Difference and Repetition, pp. 231-232: “if it is true that the conditions of possible 
experience relate to extension, there are nonetheless subjacent conditions of real experience 
which are indistinguishable from intensity as such” (–translation modified) (Différence et 
Répétition 299).  
19 For reasons of space I will focus on the terms “ground” and “surface” here, as this will be 
sufficient for my purposes. However, it is important to note here that Deleuze’s use of the terms 
“individuation” and “individual” carry a precise technical sense and are influenced by the work 
of Gilbert Simondon.  
20 Deleuze refers to “difference in itself” as “intensity” in many places throughout Difference and 
Repetition. For example, he refers to “intensive quantity … or difference in itself” and “intensity, 
understood as pure difference in itself” (DR 144, 240). “The expression 'difference of intensity' 
is a tautology” (222). Most concisely: “Intensity is difference” (DR 223).  
21 Deleuze spells “differenciation” with a “c” in order to distinguish this notion from his concept 
of “differentiation” (with a “t”). The latter concept concerns “virtual” processes whereas the 
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former concept concerns “actual” processes: “differentiation determines the virtual … 
differenciation expresses the actualization of this virtual” (DR 209). The reciprocal relation of 
both of these concepts is designated by Deleuze’s notion of “different/ciation” (DR 245).  
22 Deleuze spells “Incapacity [Impouvoir]” with the majuscule so as to indicate it is a 
fundamental or transcendental Incapacity.  
23 Very little has been written on Deleuze’s reconceptualization of the dynamic sublime. This is a 
considerable lacuna, given how important a role the sublime plays in Difference and Repetition.  
24 As Daniel Smith notes: “It would be nonsensical to speak of an infinitely small term that can 
be considered singularly” (Essays on Deleuze 249). 	  
25 Scare quotes are necessary here because there is no ‘all’; there is no “set of all sets.” If reality 
is univocal Intensity/Difference, then the idea of there being some totality, or set of all sets, is 
dismissed as a remnant of Identitarian metaphysics of uni-versality. Rather, as I have shown 
intensive magnitudes cannot be ‘added up’ to make a ‘whole’ that would be the sum of its 
parts—only extensive magnitudes work that way. Rather intensive magnitudes are purely 
relational (like the differentials of the calculus); and differential relations cannot be added up (to 
make a whole). This is why Deleuze speaks of  “the inexistence of a whole which could be 
thought” (Cinema 2 168).  
26 For a brilliant account of the role of intensive magnitude and quantitative difference in Kant’s 
philosophy and its fundamental importance in Post-Kantian debates see Marco Giovanelli’s 
Reality and Negation – Kant’s Principle of Anticipations of Perception. My account of these 
issues here is indebted to Giovanelli’s work.  
27 Deleuze addresses this point in DR, p. 234.  
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28 The relations between the speeding up of infinite velocity and its slowing down in contractile 
inhibitions is what Deleuze refers to in the citation given above (p. 20) as “potentiality” 
(speeding up/expanding) and “depotentialisation” (slowing down/contracting). Deleuze no doubt 
also has in mind Spinoza’s conception of the differential relation between movement and rest 
conceived as degrees of power.  
29 The question regarding the relation between intensities and virtual Ideas in Deleuze’s 
philosophy is currently under debate and in need of further research. Some scholars claim that 
Deleuze’s intensities just are virtual Ideas, while others claim that we must draw a firm 
distinction between the two. For an overview of the debate see Sean Bowden’s “The Intensive 
Expression of the Virtual.” Bowden argues that we must draw a firm distinction between 
intensities and Ideas. I am inclined to agree with his arguments. However, there are also good 
reasons in support of the claim that Ideas are intensities.  
30 Deleuze’s transcendental stupidity could acceptably be called “transcendental Incapacity” 
which latter name is in some ways preferable to the former in that it does away with the 
influence of any common connotations of the term “stupidity” on Deleuze’s notion.  
31 “For a brief moment we enter into that schizophrenia in principle which characterizes the 
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